體驗區
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| 篇名 |
洛克的認識論
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| 作者 |
張奉箴
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| 中文摘要 |
洛克(John Locke，1963-1704)於一六三二年，生於英國布里斯陶(Bristol)附近一座小城物凌頓(Wrington)自幼受的是清教徒(Puritan)的家庭教育。後在牛津大學，攻讀哲學和醫學。他的性格，更愛實際，因此一生專務科學、醫學和政治。一七○四年逝世。 洛克一面深受笛卡爾影響，致力解決我們的認識能力問題；另一面又受培根和霍布士的影響，傾向於經驗論。一六九○年，洛克出版他的最有哲學代表性的著作，人類的悟性論(An Essay concerning human understanding)。這是一本探討知識論的書，強調：人的知識都是來自經驗。這本書的主旨有三，便是：一、探討觀念的來源；二、說明正確性知識的本質；三、言明悟性能力的極限。 洛克首先極力反對柏拉圖的生得、先天學說，聲稱：人類並沒有帶來任何先天的知識，所有的觀念，都是來自後天的感覺；或者來自對外面事物的感覺（外覺），或者來自人內心動作的反省（內覺）。外覺的印象形成了單純觀念，內覺的反省構成了複雜觀念。外覺可以獲得各種感覺體材料；內覺的反省藉賴懷疑、思維、推理、和意欲，可以組成觀念知識。所以感覺和反省是悟性的兩種能力，就如暗室內的兩扇窗戶導入光明的知識。 洛克追隨伽利略的意見，把物質的可感覺性，區分為兩種：便是：一、基本（原性質(Qualitates Primariae)，便是物體內存有的真實特性，譬如：幾何，伸張、形態、運動等。依照洛克的意見，這些可感覺性，在外物上確實直正存在。二、是次要性質(Qualitates Secundariae)，便是物質體依照主觀的認識能力而形成的，譬如：顏色、聲音、香味、觸覺、冷熱等。依照洛克的意見，這些可感覺性，是我們認識能力的主觀型態，和外物所有的真像，是不相符合的。在這屬性之下，洛克運用因果原理的推理作用，認為：應當有使這些屬性常常結合在一起的原因，便是不可認識的自主體。這便是克的形上不可知論(Metaphysical agnosticism)。這種不可知論，當然是錯誤的。 洛克認為：觀念是知識的基礎。觀念的清晰與否，關係到知識的真偽。因此沒有觀念，便沒有知識。沒有清晰的觀念沒有正確精密的知識。所以對於自然科學，洛克也認為是蓋然性的。對於神學，洛克認為僅是宗教的信仰而已。 洛克的認識論，影響了法國的感覺主義，和自然神主義的宗教哲學，以及功利主義的倫理學和聯想的心理學，特別是影響英國的經驗主義的認識論。笛卡爾論認識論，所設的疑點，洛克設法為他解決，便是：我們直接認識的，並不是外物，而是我們主觀內的一種表像，一種變態；在外物各等屬性之下，我們所設立的自立體在形上學上是不可知的。 洛克的不可知論，是錯誤的。造成這種錯誤的主要原因，是洛克忽略了個別自立體的單一性。因為我們的感觀，每當認識依附體時，我們的理智，立即認識自立體，是用不到推理作用的。原來自立體和依附體（性質）不是兩種「東西」。依附體（性質）原是自立體的成全，和自立體的延伸。
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| 英文摘要 |
John Locke(1632-1704), a native of Wrington(near Bristol), England, was educated at Oxford and held several high position in government. Besides his most influential work An Essay concerning Human Understanding 1690, he wrote Letters on toleration (1685-1689), Two Treatises on Civil Government (1689), Some Thoughts on Education (1693), The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), and the posthumously published work, Of the Conduct of the understanding. That of which we are immediately aware and that which constitutes the immediate object of our knowledge is, according to Locke, an idea and only an idea. Thus, when it is said that we must be satisfied with what we experience, he means that we know only our ideas, whether of sensation (drawn from the external world)or of reflection (drawn from the internal operation of the mind). Locke stresses experience, but experience is not immediately of objective reality; rather the object immediately experienced is the idea. What has been said does not mean that for Locke the only things in existence are ideas; some ideas, he says, do truly represent objective reality. to indicate what he means, he distinguishes between our ideas of primary and our ideas of senondaly quality (an echo of Descartes). the ideas which we have of primary qualities (solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number)do exist in reality as we experience them. However, secondary qualities (color, taste. sound, for example)do not exist as such in reality. Instead, he holds that there exist in reality some “powers” capable of causing these ideas in us, but such ideas do not correspond to or represent what actually is. Hence, these ideas are subjective. Locke does not deny the existence of substances, whether spiritual or material, but he equivalently says that we can have no knowledge of them as they are. In this matter he distinguishes between “real”and “nominal”essences or substances, the former referring to what they are in themselves(unknowvable by us),and the latter referring to the mere grouping together of accidents or qualities or operations. Such groups are all that we can know as substances. In this explanation the phenomenalism of Locke becomes clear, since all we can know are the mere appearances or accidents, and these in no way reveal,even in a minimal sense,anything about the principle of operation or the substance itself. In this context, then, accidents are looked on as a sort of cloak which hides rather than manifests the nature of the being, and with these accidents our konwledge terminates. What has been seen concerning Locke’s views on substances enters intimately into his study of general ideas. Since all that we know is what is concretely experienced here and now, and since experience really means sense experience, it is to be expected that Locke will have trouble in explaining universal ideas. He does find such trouble, and basically it is because of his insistence that we can know only “nominal” essences. Only singular things exist, and so our true ideas should be only particular ones. However, Locke sees that if that position is taken too literally it would reduce science to a knowledge of the isolated and disconnected singulars, and thus universalization would be without foundation. Since he is not willing to go quite that far, and yet refuses to admit any abstraction which would in any way touch on the real nature of anything, he tries to find another way out. He seeks to avoid the extremes of utter singularity and of universalization through abstraction by the devices of separation(the mental selection of those ideas which are shared by several beings)and relting (referring those ideas to several beings). thereby, he feels that one forms ideas which are general in character without being universal in the traditional sense. His explanation is at least an admission that merely discrete, singular and isolated experience can not provide a solid dfoundation for scientific work. He also admits that in some unspecified way“nature”provides the foundation for our generalizing, but this remains linked with his view that all we can know are sense qualities and that these actually constitute the only essence knowable. This very shallow foundation for universal ideas will provide a point for Hume to attack. Locke’s influence sowed the seeds of the French philosophy of Sensationalism, the religious philosophy of Deism, the ethics of Utilitarianism, the psychology of Associationism, and the epistemlolgy of Empiricism, most especially the latter philosophy which was further developed by Irish Idealist George Berkeley(1685-1753)and by Scotland’s most distinguished philosopher David Hume(1711-1776). A theory that places such a heavy emphasis upon sense perception does not make adequate allowance for the fact that man’s senses are limited and imperfect. Our senses are often deceived, which even Locke himself recognized. Empiricism is not will equipped to separate fact form fancy. Hence, Empiricism gives man no certainty. What is only probable knowledge is, by the same token, wholly questionable knowledge.
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| 頁次 |
1-23
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| 關鍵詞 |
TSSCI
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| 卷期 |
9
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| 日期 |
199012
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| 刊名 |
教育學刊
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| 出版單位 |
國立高雄師範大學教育學系
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